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Clinicians in the fields of mental health,
neuroscientists, and social psychologists
have been increasingly interested in how
persons with psychiatric conditions expe-
rience a range of difficulties related to
how they think about themselves and oth-
ers. These difficulties include problems
forming and retrieving the specific auto-
biographical memories (AM) that ground
a sense of personal identity (McAdams,
2001). They have also involved diminish-
ments in the capacity to engage in acts
of mentalization or metacognition which
allow for the understanding of mental
states. Both of these forms of dysfunction
are of increasing relevance given that each
has been commonly observed across dif-
ferent psychiatric conditions, appears rela-
tively independently from symptoms, and
is uniquely linked to functional impair-
ment (Dimaggio and Lysaker, 2010; Liu
et al., in press).
To date deficits in AM and metacogni-
tion have mostly been analyzed separately.
Psychopathology research has tended
to explore either one or the other,
thus neglecting the larger issue of how
metacognition and AM are produced by
systems which are likely closely related
and likely feed and support one another
(Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2011). In
development, AM and Theory of Mind
(ToM) tend be influenced by common fac-
tors (Nelson and Fivush, 2004). Persons
who present with overgeneralized AM also
experience mentalizing problems includ-
ing reduced affect awareness and poorer
ToM (Palmieri et al., 2012).
Psychotherapy research and general
neuroscience have begun to examine how
these functions support one another and
how disruptions in either AM or metacog-
nition might lead to decrements in the
other. To explore this issue we review
psychopathology research concerned sepa-
rately with problems in AM and metacog-
nition in two forms of mental illness:
schizophrenia and personality disorders
(PD). We then discuss the advances from
psychotherapy research and neuroscience
for understanding how these two phenom-
ena are related and comment on opportu-





AM are understood to be a core aspect
of healthy function across the human
life span (Conway, 2005; Singer et al.,
in press). Being able to retrieve personal
memories allows persons to form repre-
sentations of themselves as unique beings
who exist with meaningful continuity over
time. They also provide a context for mak-
ing sense of what is happening interper-
sonally in the moment.
Such processes often seem disrupted in
persons suffering with significant forms
of psychopathology. Instead of resorting
to key past events as a prototype for
meaning-making and action predictions,
patients might resort to overgeneralized
memories or intellectualizations, in order
to make sense of their choices, dilem-
mas and conflicts. For instance, patients
with Narcissistic PD might respond to an
interpersonal conflict not by recalling spe-
cific memories about their live in which
the conflict was solved, but rather with
a generalization about others as inept or
ungrateful. Patients diagnosed with psy-
chosis might respond to the same dilemma
without any clear recollection from the
past, or if the past was recalled it might
be disjointed and not clearly related to the
problem in the moment.
To date, qualitative and quantitative
work has suggested at least six differ-
ent though related ways (Dimaggio and
Semerari, 2001; Lysaker et al., 2001) in
which AM are disturbed in psychosis and
PD. First, AM in persons with these con-
ditions often lack clear space and time
boundaries. It is difficult to detect where
and when an event has taken place.
Second, when memories are retrieved they
are often made sense of through the
use of intellectualization and moral rules,
without a nuanced sense of what actu-
ally happened between the specific peo-
ple involved in the memory; for instance
it might be recalled that certain people
were ungrateful or demanding without
there being sufficient detail to determine
what might have led up to that event.
Third, descriptions of others present in
the narrative episode are often sketchy and
the sequences of the actions and reac-
tions are difficult to follow and bereft of
detail.
Fourth, within the narrative episode
the dialogue that takes place among the
characters is often repetitive and stereo-
typed. Exchanges between people may be
recalled but they tend to follow more of
a formula than to reflect recollections of
a unique conversation. Fifth, the narrative
theme of the memory may be redundant,
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often reflective of the most basic or gross
set of motives, and the story itself tends
to be formulaic; memories may center
around threat and fight/flight responses
and end without any resolution or an
irreversible resolution (e.g., a severing of
connection to another person). A sixth
problem is that AM recollected lack a pic-
torial quality which might enable a listener
to imagine what happened. Memories
may lack details related to visual, audi-
tory, olfactory, or gustatory cues, ele-
ments which would lend an opportunity
to understand the memory as a unique
experience.
Turning to explorations of specific dis-
orders, research has suggested that many
patients with avoidant, dependent and
obsessive-compulsive PD featured reduced
AM specificity (Spinhoven et al., 2009).
Similarly, narratives of patients with bor-
derline PD have frequently been found to
be overly general (Maurex et al., 2010),
less often concerned with prototypical
life events and moreover less coherent
(Jørgensen et al., 2012). Autobiographical
narratives produced by patients with bor-
derline PD portray life events as either
imbued with dysregulated affect and lack-
ing any sense of agency (Adler et al., 2012).
Regarding schizophrenia, fundamental
disruptions have been observed (Lysaker
and Lysaker, 2008). Manywith schizophre-
nia are less able to spontaneously recall
memories which involved discrete events
that occurred in a specific time and place
(Corcoran and Frith, 2003; Riutort et al.,
2003; D’Argembeau et al., 2008). There
may be lesser recall of specific or well-
defined memories, and a tendency to recall
more public than private events (Cuervo-
Lombard et al., 2007; Raffard et al., 2010).
Further, the specific AM of patients with
schizophrenia are less consistent with the
overall self-image they endorse and the self
lacks agency; this suggests a deficit not just
in retrieving memories but also in inte-
grating different aspects of identity into a





Literature also suggests that patients with
PD and schizophrenia suffer from a wide
array of dysfunctions in thinking about
themselves and others. Referred to as dys-
function in metacognition or mentalizing,
this includes difficulties recognizing men-
tal states, correctly naming them and using
them in a flexible way and as a reliable
source of information.
Research has specifically suggested that
many with PD experience difficulties
describing their own emotions, seeing
links between emotion and thoughts
(Semerari et al., 2007; Nicolò et al.,
2011), and seeing their own thought pro-
cesses in a detached and reflective way
(Bateman and Fonagy, 2004; Semerari
et al., 2005; Dimaggio et al., 2009a,b).
Difficulties appraising the mental states of
others has also been noted (Fonagy et al.,
2002) though relatively less impairment
has been observed in more basic labo-
ratory ToM tasks (Domes et al., 2009;
Ghiassi et al., 2010). The combination
of poor mentalizing and PD have also
predicted poorer vocational outcome (Bly
et al., 2012); poorer mentalizing skills in
patients with avoidant and borderline PD
is a negative predictor of psychotherapy
outcome (Gullestad et al., in press). In
general, persons with PD appear to have
limited abilities to use mentalization in
order to respond to psychological prob-
lems (Carcione et al., 2011). The ability to
reading the mind of the others within tasks
that call for empathy have been found to be
problematic for persons with narcissistic
PD, and a deficit of which they are unaware
of (Ritter et al., 2011).
More pronounced metacognitive
deficits have been found in schizophre-
nia. Compared with persons without
psychosis, deficits have been noted in a
broad array of assessments of both cogni-
tive and affective ToM tasks (Brüne, 2005;
Penn et al., 2008), and these problems
are associated with negative symptoms
and poor social functioning (Brüne et al.,
2011). The narratives of persons with
schizophrenia feature severe inabilities
to identify mental states, to see the world
from multiple perspectives, and to use
that knowledge to respond to psycho-
logical challenges (Lysaker et al., 2007;
Mitchell et al., 2012) both as a trait
marker (Lysaker et al., 2011b) and as a
result of trauma (Lysaker et al., 2011c).
Empathy has been found a problem for
many with schizophrenia (Derntl et al.,
2009).
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LINK OF
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY WITH
METACOGNITION
In parallel with these developments, neu-
roscientists have also offered evidence of
a close relationship between AM and
metacognition. For instance imaging stud-
ies have suggested that AM is supported
with brain areas which partially over-
lap with ones devoted to attributions
to mental states (Rabin et al., 2010;
Spreng and Grady, 2010; Mar, 2011;
Rabin and Rosenbaum, 2012). Spreng
and Mar (2012) have noted that even
non-overlapping cortical areas linked with
AM and mentalistic attributions, share
a network of connections. Whitehead
et al. (2009) have suggested that the abil-
ity to engage in pretend play is cou-
pled with activations in cortical areas
implicated in both ToM and narrative
processes.
THE INTERPLAY OF IMPAIRMENTS IN
AM ANDMETACOGNITION IN
PSYCHOTHERAPY
While much psychopathology research
has considered impairment in AM and
metacognition separately, recent work in
psychotherapy has begun to urge that
successful treatment requires a consid-
eration of the relationship of the two.
Among those are mentalization-based
treatment (Bateman and Fonagy, 2004),
metacognitive interpersonal therapy for
PD (Dimaggio et al., 2007, 2012), and
metacognition-oriented psychotherapy for
psychosis (Lysaker et al., 2007, 2011a; Buck
and Lysaker, 2009; Salvatore et al., 2009,
2012). These approaches share the idea
that a key aspect of therapy is to help
patients to narrate specific AM—instead
of resorting to overgeneralized memories
or intellectualizations—as specific AM are
the most fertile soil to think about for
mental states (Dimaggio et al., 2010, 2012;
Lysaker et al., 2011a). In other words,
the enrichment of AM may promote
improvements in metacognitive capacity.
To address this possibility these procedures
train therapists to seek specific memories.
For instance, overgeneralized recalls have
been suggested as a cue to explore for the
specifics of narrative episodes (Dimaggio
et al., 2012).
The rationale for seeking and think-
ing about specific episodes is based on the
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assumption that metacognitive reflection
is at its heart a consideration of real life
events, and as such impoverished AM
offer little fertile ground for metacognitive
activity. Accordingly, for many patients the
appearance of more nuanced AM precedes
the development of the ability to think in
more complex ways about oneself and oth-
ers; narrative episodes may provide oppor-
tunities for patients to recognize actual
chains of thoughts, affects and behaviors
in interpersonal interactions (Dimaggio
et al., 2012). Other patients though may
need to reach some basic level of access
to mental states, in particular awareness
of affects and their links with thoughts
and behaviors, before their AM emerge.
Formal analysis of case studies has shown
that successful therapy involves the pro-
gressive growth of narrative capacity and
aspects of metacognition, with the abil-
ity to narrate one’s own story improving
first, then followed by awareness of one’s
own states and awareness of the mental
states of the others (Lysaker et al., 2005,
2007).
IMPLICATIONS FOR TREATMENT AND
RESEARCH IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
While difficulties in AM and metacog-
nition have been treated separately as
factors which are present and influence
outcome in significant forms of mental
illness, psychotherapy, and neuroscience
research suggests the need for these phe-
nomena to be studied together. More
efforts would seem to have the poten-
tial to answer several questions, includ-
ing whether one form of deficit emerges
before the other. Do metacognitive dys-
functions result in impoverished AM or
diminished AM leave persons less able to
think about mental states (Dimaggio et al.,
2008, 2009a,b)? Are AM and metacog-
nition best thought of as two networks
operating together or a reflection of a
single core psychological process? Are
they decoupled in a similar way in non-
clinical subjects and in different forms of
psychopathology?
There is reason to believe that narrative
enrichment (Gonçalves et al., 2012) and
promoting mentalization (Bateman and
Fonagy, 2009) are features of successful
therapies; research addressing their inter-
play may guide the development of these
interventions.
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